LOANCH - Risk and return review
LOANCH - Returns and loss rates
Investment maturity
LOANCH – Platform statistics 2026
16000
investors
LOANCH – Pros & Cons
About LOANCH
Loanch is a peer-to-peer lending marketplace, launched in 2024, that sells European investors pieces of short-term consumer loans made in Malaysia and Indonesia. From EUR 10, investors buy claims on loans of one to four months from three lenders - Tambadana, AhaPay and the currently paused Ammana - at advertised rates up to about 13.7% a year, paid monthly, with a promised buyback of loans that fall behind.
Since March 2026, the platform has been operated from Zagreb by Przemek Savjetovanje d.o.o., a EUR 5,000 Croatian consulting company owned personally by Loanch's chief executive; before that, it ran from Hungary.
Independent researchers report that all three lenders - and, per two sources, the platform itself - belong to Fingular, a Singapore group whose founder previously ran Cashwagon, a lending group whose failures cost European investors millions on another platform in 2020.
Loanch itself discloses none of this, and holds no licence in any country: EU crowdfunding rules or MIFID do not cover consumer lending, so no such licence is even available to it.
There is no deposit protection or compensation scheme and no resale market.
Roughly EUR 115 million has been invested since launch by 16,000 investors.
Investing is free; Loanch earns from the gap between Asian borrower rates and what investors receive, and spends heavily on bonuses and affiliate commissions.
Functionality
For Investors
LOANCH - Articles
Useful Information
There is no real selection process to describe, because there is no independent party choosing loans. Loanch lists loans already made by three lenders that independent researchers place inside the same group that owns the platform - so 'onboarding a lender' means the group deciding to fund itself through its own retail channel. The platform's stated standard is contractual, not financial: lenders must offer a 30-day buyback. Published per lender: country, average rate and some reports - but no owner for two of the three, no licence details, no loan volumes and no retained stake. When Ammana stopped providing new loans in March 2026, investors were simply told to redirect their auto-invest settings.
Substantial and specific. In early 2026 investor withdrawals froze for weeks; the platform blamed a payments upgrade, but its provider Quicko had its Polish payment licence revoked on 21 January 2026 for failing to manage its business prudently, and in May 2026 was placed on Poland's national sanctions list over alleged Russian fund flows - the Polish decisions do not name Loanch, but the connection is documented by reviewers. One specialist site titles its assessment 'Why You Should Stay Away'; another excludes Loanch from its safe-platform list outright. Trustpilot shows 2.9 out of 5 from just nine reviews as of August 2026, including an unresolved withdrawal complaint. The verified backstory weighs heaviest: the group founder's previous venture, Cashwagon, defaulted on Mintos in 2020 - about EUR 9.4 million of European retail exposure, roughly EUR 5.9 million lost, and one unit closed down by Vietnamese authorities.
The public faces are CEO Przemyslaw Januszaniec - who also personally owns the Croatian operating company - CFO Petar Brkic, hired at the March 2026 move to Zagreb, COO Jakub Cernik, and founder Nik Sinickis, now head of product. The names that matter more do not appear on the site: Fingular, the Singapore group that independent researchers say owns the lenders and the platform, was founded by Maxim Chernushchenko - previously CEO of Cashwagon, whose lending companies failed on the Mintos platform in 2020 - with Russian businessman Vadim Gurinov as co-founder. Fingular's own website does not mention Loanch either; the connection is documented only by outside researchers.
Three lenders, all owned by Fingular of Singapore, which also owns Loanch. Tambadana is by far the largest at 93.6 percent of the book, a Malaysian short-term consumer lender with EUR 214.3 million placed and EUR 65.4 million funded through the platform. Its FY2024 audit showed a return to profit of about 2.18 million ringgit, roughly EUR 440,000, but own capital of only 2.5 percent of assets, debt at 38.9 times equity, impairments equal to 38.6 percent of revenue and a 9.7 percent provision rate. Since FY2024 it has released management reports rather than audited accounts. AhaPay is a Malaysian buy-now-pay-later lender. Its FY2025 audit showed a loss of about 3.9 million ringgit, negative equity of roughly EUR 630,000 and provisions at 192 percent of revenue, and its buyback applies only subject to financial ability. Ammana in Indonesia is suspended for new loans, and its last audit, for 2023, showed a loss of about USD 4.1 million and negative equity of about USD 6.4 million, so liabilities exceeded assets outright. None of the three names its auditor or publishes a bad-loan rate.
The whole protection is the buyback: late loans are repurchased by the lender that issued them. Three problems, all from Loanch's own documents. The marketing says 30 days late; the risk statement says 60. The terms state the obligation belongs to the lender alone - Loanch guarantees nothing. And there is no group guarantee behind the lenders, two of which showed less than zero capital in their latest accounts; the third, now carrying nearly all new lending, has capital equal to 2.5% of its loan book while setting aside 12% for bad loans. The borrowers repay in ringgit and rupiah while you are owed euros, and no currency protection is disclosed - a currency slide lands on those same thin lenders.
Loanch charges investors nothing - no deposit, withdrawal or investment fees, and no tax is withheld. But the zero is current practice, not a promise: the terms expressly allow fees to be introduced, and currency conversion costs on non-euro deposits fall on you via the unnamed payment provider. The real economics are hidden in the spread: Malaysian and Indonesian short-term consumer lending charges borrowers far more than the 11 to 14 percent passed to investors, and the difference funds the lenders, the platform and some of the sector's largest affiliate commissions. Nothing about that spread, or the borrowers' actual rates, is published.